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**CHALLENGING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. “WET JOBS” AND
 THEIR IMPACT ON DENMARK**



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Zusammenfassung:

**DIE HERAUSFORDERUNG NATIONALER SOUVERÄNITÄT. „WET JOBS“ UND IHRE AUSWIRKUNG
 AUF DÄNEMARK**

Wenn im Bereich der Intelligence Studies von „wet jobs“, d.h. verdeckten Operationen und targeted killings die Rede ist, wird im Fall von Schauplätzen während des Kalten Krieges in den seltensten Fällen an Dänemark gedacht. Dieser Beitrag zeigt, dass allerdings auch das Territorium dieses Staates mit solchen Operationen in Verbindung steht. Ausgehend von einer Betrachtung des noch sehr fragmentarischen Forschungsstandes zu diesem Thema wird Dänemark als Schauplatz solcher Operationen beleuchtet und dessen Reaktionen darauf werden beschrieben und analysiert. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich im Zuge der notwendigen Auseinandersetzung

mit diesem Thema die Haltung des Staates und seines Inlandsnachrichten- und Sicherheitsdienstes „Politietis Efterretningstjeneste“ (PET) verändert hat, ja verändern musste, um mit diesen Bedrohungsszenarien umzugehen.

When asked about targeted killings or the use of violence in their former business, most ex-intelligence officers reject it as James Bond-like fantasies which have little to do with reality. The daily business of intelligence officers is considerably duller, haunted by routines, and focused on procuring information. Others might take the moral high ground and discard as ludicrous the idea that they would ever fall to this level. In most cases this is a safe position since files are kept classified or evidence destroyed. This article contests this position. Based on the case Denmark, it thematizes how targeted killings and wet jobs,¹ as a dark side of globalization, pose a challenge to the fundament of sovereign states.

The East German chief of foreign intelligence, General Werner Grossmann, is a good example of an intelligence leader with a supposedly clear conscience. In an open letter to the government of unified Germany, he denied any knowledge of “kidnappings, assassinations or murders” conducted by his former service. He stated that claiming the opposite would “simply be untrue”, as “crimes were not utilized to promote our intelligence aims. They were neither part of the practical tool kit nor of any theoretical deliberations”.² In his 2001 memoirs, Grossmann repeated that “we never conspired with murderers, drug dealers, or arms traffickers”.³ The former deputy minister of state security and his merry men had in other words “a cool head, warm hearts, and clean hands”, as fit the heirs of Felix Dzerzhinsky.⁴ However, a strange episode in his memoirs indicates that Grossmann may have remembered events wrongly.

In the aftermath of the defection of Lieutenant Werner Stiller from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) industrial espionage branch in 1979, one of his superiors was contacted by West German counterintelligence and invited to a meeting in Vienna. Grossmann approved an operation which would allow the East Germans to learn more of their opponents’ modus operandi. In the eleventh hour, the East Germans drew back their decoy and merely sent an observation team. They had developed cold feet as they feared the West Germans were planning an abduction or maybe even a drive-by-




Fig. 1: The last East German chief of foreign intelligence, General Werner Grossmann.

shooting. As it turned out, the West Germans also had second thoughts, and in the end the observation teams ended up observing each other.⁵ In a world, where at least one side claimed never to dream of using violence, it seems more than odd that both sides out the blue and on the very same day got the idea that their adversary would use violence. The alternative explanation is that such measures were (and are), if not common, at least within the realistic repertoire.

Targeted killings, abductions, and other wet jobs are good regredience for spy films or sensationalist journalism. It is suitably dramatic and “the license to kill” inspires both the imagination and laymen’s preconceptions of what the secret world is all about. This might also be one of the reasons why such operations make bad science or why scholars often keep the subject at arm’s length. The anxiety of being branded tabloid in the academic community

is not unfounded, especially in continental Europe, where Intelligence Studies is still a young tradition. Considering this background, a current growing academic interest to the field is remarkable, and within the past few years, a couple of scholarly works have been written dealing with fundamental issues of wet jobs. Susanne Muhle from the Berlin Wall Memorial in Berlin was the first of this generation of scholars to present a comprehensive study on abduction practices and the abductors of the East German Ministry of State Security.⁶ This year, Danish Christian Axboe Nielsen presented an important study on one European country known for its excessive operations against former citizens abroad, namely the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.⁷ Furthermore, it is announced that next year, the German intelligence scholar Christopher Nehring presents a study based on 120 worldwide cases of targeted killings.⁸ Already, Muhle and Axboe Nielsen have proven that serious research is possible, and that empirical and methodological well-founded studies enable lessons to be learned on this field.

The new generation of scholars were able to circumvent the evident problem of finding sources by using a combination of prosecution and intelligence sources. Of course, the sources issue remains one of the big challenges of the field. Despite the so-called Archival Revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, material concerning wet jobs are still scarce, and the archival searches are not straight forward. Both during the peaceful revolution of 1989 and in the years to follow, intelligence officers were attentive of the fact that evidence of actual crimes abroad might not serve them well in the new political order. Even in Germany, where the Ministry of State Security (MfS) was given only a short time to destroy evidence, it was apparent that the shredding of files relating to such operations were of a high priority.

Following the German unification, the Central Investigation Agency for Government and Party Crimes (Zentrale Ermittlungsstelle Regierungs- und Vereinigungskriminalität, ZERV), under the Berlin Police, were given the task of dealing with the crimes of the former East German regime.⁹ The prime aim was to uncover cases involving assassinations and abductions. The Stasi Archives (BStU, Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik) provided the materials relating to wet jobs.

Thus, the files were exempt from public use while the investigations went on. The files were used in the prosecution, for instance, of the agents "Karete" and "Rennfahrer," who were sent to West Berlin in 1975 to assassinate an East German émigré and political activist.¹⁰ Upon completion of the criminal investigation, the BStU research department was able to initiate its own research, the most prominent example of this being the work of Muhle. The search for assassinations continued, however only in the case of the refugee helper Wolfgang Welsch was it possible to prove an attempted murder; actual killings were not proven.

To be fair: not only the former socialist camp is guilty of withholding or destroying materials. Western intelligence and security services have not been eager to follow the path of archival openness seen in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. With a few exceptions, it is notable to what length Western European security services are willing to go when protecting both crimes and terrorists in the name of secrecy.

CASE STUDY DENMARK

In 2008, a small survey was conducted in Denmark, a country not generally perceived as a global hot



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Fig. 2: Author and dissident Viktor Frunza.

spot. The study had methodological limits as it was largely based on available literature and only to an insignificant extent on archival material. The study only focused on the latter part of the Cold War period. Though it was only a superficial study of one of the Cold War's secondary battlefields, it came up with three cases of wet jobs connected to Denmark or to Danes. Interestingly, these cases happened in the era of so-called *détente* in which the Cold War was, in the public sphere, often mentioned in the past tense. The three cases in question were the kidnapping of the Bulgarian émigré Boris Arsov in 1974, the Danish agent "Piccadilly's" involvement in the Markov killing in 1978, and the attempted assassination of the Romanian author Victor Frunza in 1981.¹¹

The journalist and author Hristo Hristov had been able to find new material in the archives of the former Committee for State Security (*Dyrzhavna sigurnost*, DS) about the Bulgarian cases. The Arsov-affair was to some extent known in Denmark, whereas the Markov case was world famous, though, of course, not due to the Danish connection. Arsov was a Bulgarian political émigré who had left his home country in 1970 and found asylum in Denmark's second largest city, Århus. In 1974, he disappeared from Denmark, only to re-appear on Bulgarian state television confessing the betrayal of his country.¹² In his Danish exile, Arsov had engaged in anti-communist activities and the publishing of the exile journal *Levski*, and had thus been "playing with fire" only to be "timely stopped in his dangerous activities" according to the DS.¹³ This cessation foreshadowed either his liquidation in Denmark, or as this was not practically possible, his abduction. On 11th April 1974, Arsov met in Odense with Colonel Dimitar Iotov, deputy chief of Bulgarian counterintelligence, and another intelligence officer. They either lured or sedated him and brought him across the iron curtain to East Berlin. From Berlin he was moved to Sofia. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and he subsequently hanged himself with three neckties, items he was surprisingly able to bring with him for his incarceration.¹⁴ The background for this strange and tragic affair cannot be uncovered as the related investigation files were destroyed. However, the comments by officers of the Sofia HQ to the Paris residentura clearly show a sense of satisfaction at the outcome within the DS: "The operation by our

services against the traitor Boris Arsov in 1974 was assessed as exemplary! The whole job was effective, left no compromising clues and was brought to a conclusion. His kidnapping was only noticed when he appeared in the court room. No one could prove anything against us. The trial followed all the rules. Arsov was not sentenced to death, although he deserved it. Why create martyrs? It was enough just to send him to prison. A few months later he died. But what was more natural than that? Clearly such a perfect scenario would not work every month."¹⁵

The Markov case was aimed of course not against a person on Danish soil directly. However, it involved the Danish citizen Francesco Gulino, aka "Piccadilly", who was active for the Bulgarian service from 1971 to 1990.¹⁶ The Bulgarian files did not deliver a smoking gun¹⁷ that Piccadilly was the killer of Bulgarian dissident author Georgi Markov. Though he had been surveilling him the previous years, the documents "left little to the imagination".¹⁸



Fig. 3: Bulgarian dissident author Georgi Markov.

The Romanian Victor Frunza arrived in Denmark in August 1980. For years he had been critical toward the communist regime and subject to extensive Securitate surveillance. From his new home in exile, he continued the opposition to the rule of party

chief Nicolai Ceausescu, who during a state visit in November 1980 was awarded the highest Danish order, Elefantordenen. Frunza both wrote for the exile journal *The Marathon Runner* and cooperated with the Romanian team at Radio Free Europe which apparently earned him an undesired place on the Securitate’s death lists. Though accounts differ in detail, it is apparent that an attempt on his life failed in April 1981.¹⁹

The three cases have in common that the target persons were all politically active émigrés. The granting of asylum to dissidents was naturally well received during the Cold War, not least because it served the global struggle with communism. However, the new citizens arrived with unforeseen problems in their backpacks, as they brought the political conflicts of their home countries with them. It confronted the authorities in the host countries with a concrete dilemma. On the one hand, the host state could be expected to protect the émigrés from surveillance and attempts at retribution by their former home countries. On the other hand, the Western European countries feared that the home countries would use their former citizen as potential for a recruitment tool. The basic predicament whether the exiles were “the secret weapon or the victims of the Cold War” was the subject of an international conference in Lublin in 2009 and a subsequent publication.²⁰

In the Danish cases during the Cold War, given the balance between émigrés personal security and their right to exercise freedom of speech without fear of reprisals, weighed against the host states own short term security needs, it was the latter consideration that had priority. This became evident in the reactions of the Danish Police Intelligence (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET) to the Frunza case. The Danish intelligence service was, in detail, informed about the attempted assassination of April 1981 and knew that Frunza – for obvious reasons – feared for his life. However, the PET’s prime concern was apparently not the safety of the émigrés, but rather the rumor that he might be an agent of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).²¹ In other words, state security went before personal safety, and the lack of interest in the fate of the émigrés was a general feature in the priorities and the personal resources of the PET.²²

The question of émigrés safety is by no means limited to the Cold War era. Nevertheless, Denmark



Fig. 4: Photo of Frunza made during a Securitate observation.

was only gradually getting accustomed to globalization and its consequences to national security. The arrival of Eastern European émigrés was in this context just the first step on the path to a changing world where both people and political conflicts were able to migrate across larger distances. The next step on this journey was the arrival of Arab migrants in the 1970s and 1980s along with the terrorism which accompanied the Middle East conflict. Also, in this case, the PET seemed for many years unwilling to allocate time and resources.²³

REACTIONS

For a traditional security service, whose primary task was the surveillance of communists and other left-wing elements, as well as keeping an eye on the Soviet, Polish, and East German embassies, early globalization developments constituted a serious test, and it became clear that adapting and learning lessons was obviously not the strength of the PET. In the years after the Cold War, this impression was reinforced as new information shed light on the cases above. Instead of embracing this, the Danish authorities either did nothing or took on defensive positions. In the case of “Piccadilly”, they seemed more eager to secure the Bulgarian ex-agent’s living standards in Austria, rather than attempting to get

to the bottom of the case.²⁴ In 1998, the head of the PET, Birgitte Stampe (1993-2002), displayed both dispassion and disinterest when commenting on the Arsov-kidnapping, as she would not rule out that Arsov had voluntarily travelled to Bulgaria. She ruled out further investigations, stating “it is too old. It makes no sense to start to criticize or to protest about something which happened 24 years ago. The world has changed quite a lot since. Bulgaria has an entirely different leadership.”²⁵

Stampe’s stance might of course be valid from the point of view of foreign policy. However, the inability or even resistance to learn from failures is particularly problematic since intelligence takes place in an environment which the Nestor of British Intelligence Studies, Michael Herman, characterized as “insulated”. He warned against “institutional satisfaction; the feeling of being ‘special’ is liable to produce the ‘not-invented here’ reaction to ideas from outside”.²⁶ Thus, it is striking how both Danish officials both within the PET and outside have chosen the road of silence in dealing with the question of foreign wet jobs involving Denmark. The Chief of the PET at the time of the Arsov-abduction as well as the Frunza-incident, Ole Stig Andersen (1975-1984), wrote an almost 600 page autobiography. He gave particular focus to his own and the PET’s role in international intelligence cooperation, and he

was able to quote even small talk with the wife of CIA Director William Casey.²⁷ The concrete cases against individual Eastern European émigrés were not mentioned. The general question of émigrés was dealt with in half a sentence: “the Polish community in Denmark was of intelligence relevance”.²⁸ The absence of both the known cases, as well as the overall subject of wet jobs, was even more alarming in a commissioned report from 2009, published by the Danish Ministry of Justice, which commands the PET. A team of chosen scholars of law and history produced 16 volumes and more than 4.600 pages regarding the activities of the PET during the Cold War. The commission found no extra time or space for the topic, except to dodge concrete questions from the Danish parliament.²⁹

The Danish passiveness is stunning in the light of the challenge wet jobs pose to the national state. Max Weber defines a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”.³⁰ Thus, protecting both citizens and foreigners living within the borders of a state could be viewed as a basic expression of sovereignty. Weber stated that states may empower individuals or institutions with the right to exert violence “to the extent to which the state permits it.” But does this cover hostile states? Christian Axboe Nielsen states a similar provocative question in the case of Yugoslav targeted killings in Germany: “Why did the West German authorities tolerate the assassinations?” His conclusion is that West German reluctance to pursue the question with the Belgrade government was due to foreign policy. Though the associations were tedious, they were only one aspect of the overall bilateral relation. From a very realist or even cynical perspective other priorities were simply more important.

In the Danish case, foreign political considerations were hardly the decisive considerations, as the hesitation to act spanned more than a generation. The answers are more likely to be found in the internal mechanisms of the Danish intelligence system. The PET was preoccupied with other questions of more obvious relevance to national security in the short term (from left wing politics to Soviet diplomacy), and it was seemingly unable to act upon the challenges which globalization posed on the long term. The insulated position prolonged the inability to learn from the past. With the words of Birgitte



Fig. 5: German sociologist Max Weber.

Stampe, it was of “great historical relevance. It is very questionable to conclude that we could or should do anything today.”³¹

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

On 28th September 2018, the Danish authorities sealed off the main Island with the capital Copenhagen, thereby bringing a halt to traffic in large parts of the country on a Friday afternoon. The dramatic action was based on the concrete suspicion that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence was posing an immediate threat to an exiled leader of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) who lived in the provincial town of Ringsted.³² Although the ASMLA leaders were also suspected of intelligence activities on behalf of Saudi Arabia, the action to some extent demonstrates a new and more protective attitude concerning political émigrés on Danish territory.³³ The shift in attitude is part of a longer and bigger process of transition in the Danish Intelligence Community. Hans Jørgen Bonnichsen, the former deputy Chief of the PET (1997-2006), described the changes of his earlier employer with the words “Now we were living in the global village”.³⁴ His explanation was that the world changed after the Cold War, and the new threats were terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic and religious extremism, and organized crime.

Many of the so called new threats were of course not new at all. What was indeed new was that the PET – as with other services – in the post-Cold War years was caught in a limbo where the past key competences were no longer needed. The three old main opponents (The Soviet Union, the GDR, and the People’s Republic of Poland) either disappeared or changed their political order. Consequently, the *raison d’être* for Danish Intelligence Services and political police for generations, namely keeping socialists or peace activists on a short leash, were soon to become a political liability, and the main reason for years of external scrutiny. In other words, the PET was running out of legitimate work. In 1995, a PR-interview with the Chief of the PET, Birgitte Stampe, seems symptomatic for the crisis of the service. The journalist was able to report that Stampe liked Spaghetti and film. However, the long interview was unable to present substantial information about the actual intelligence work. The



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Fig. 6: Hans Jørgen Bonnichsen, 1997-2006 deputy chief of the PET.

closest Stampe got was a general statement that counterintelligence had less priority while counterterrorism played a larger role, “though it is difficult to see where a terror threat would come from”.³⁵

The answers to the PET-predicament were to be found in two new challenges: On the one hand police work was taken over by the intelligence services, and on the other hand, the dark sides of globalization provided the services with new tasks that also included issues relating to migrants and émigrés, as well as terrorism. The big game changer in Denmark was 9/11 which paved the way for substantial budget increases (including a doubling of personnel) and new legislation.³⁶ The protection of émigrés was a part of this new repertoire. Thus, the question was also addressed directly in the latest yearly report of the PET, though only briefly in general terms about the need as to protect the émigrés from both recruitment and repression by their former home countries.³⁷ The echo of the Cold War dilemma, namely whether émigrés are to be treated as “the secret weapon or the victims”, is still evident. However, the lessons of the past show that host countries that take their own sovereignty seriously should take active steps, not only to protect themselves from possible espionage but also to protect the people living on their territory. In the end, the monopoly of violence defines the modern state.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ The term “wet job” refers to an activity with intelligence background that tries to achieve an operational goal by using violence and brute force, for example abductions, attacks, and assassinations. It originated most likely from the Russian term “mokroe delo” used by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) for such actions. The word “wet” refers to the spilling of blood. See for example Jan Henryk Larecki, *Wielki Leksykon Tajnych Służb Świata* [Great Dictionary of the Secret Services of the World] (Warsaw 2017), 495f.
- ² Werner Grossmann, *Verbrechen gehörten nicht zu unseren Szenarien*, in: *Neues Deutschland*, 7.10.1993, <https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/446107.verbrechen-gehörten-nicht-zu-unseren-szenarien.html>.
- ³ Werner Grossmann, *Bonn im Blick. Die DDR-Aufklärung aus der Sicht ihres letzten Chefs* (Berlin 2001), 67.
- ⁴ Julie Fedor, *Russia and the Cult of State Security. The Chekist Tradition from Lenin to Putin* (London 2011), 17.
- ⁵ Werner Grossmann, *Den sidste Spionchef* (Middelfart 2004), 75.
- ⁶ Susanne Muhle, *Auftrag: Menschenraub. Entführungen von Westberliner und Bundesbürgern durch das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR* (Berlin 2015).
- ⁷ Christian Axboe Nielsen, *Yugoslavia and Political Assassinations. The history and legacy of Tito’s campaign against the emigres* (London 2021).
- ⁸ Christopher Nehring, *Geheimdienstmorde. Wenn Staaten töten – Hintergründe, Motive, Methoden* (Munich 2022).
- ⁹ 13. Sitzung Öffentliche Anhörung, *Regierungskriminalität und justitielle Aufarbeitung – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland”* (Berlin 1995), 75f.
- ¹⁰ Muhle, *Auftrag*, 110.
- ¹¹ Mette Fentz, Thomas Wegener Friis, “Våde jobs” i Danmark, in: *Arbejderhistorie. Tidsskrift for Historie, Kultur og Politik* No. 3 (2008), 67-74.
- ¹² Danmark under den Kolde Krig. Vol. 2 (Copenhagen 2005), 465; Peer Henrik Hansen, *Migration. An Intelligence and Security Perspective*, in: Ann Kathrine Isaacs (ed.), *Immigration and Emigration in historical perspective* (Pisa 2007), 141-152, here 148.
- ¹³ Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin archive. The KGB in Europe and the West* (London 1999), 507.
- ¹⁴ Hristo Hristov, *Kill the wanderer* (Sofia 2005), 93ff.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 95.
- ¹⁶ Hristo Hristov, *The double life of agent Piccadilly* (Sofia 2008), 16.
- ¹⁷ The term “smoking gun” means an evidence so clear-cut and distinct that it solves a current and unsolved case and charges the person guilty. It refers to the gun in the hands of a murderer, still smoking from the deadly shot.
- ¹⁸ Christopher Nehring, *Umbrella or pen? The murder of Georgi Markov. New facts and old questions*, in: *Journal of Intelligence History* 16, No. 1 (2017), 47-58, here 52.
- ¹⁹ Richard H. Cummings, *Cold War Radio. The dangerous history of American broadcasting in Europe 1959-1989* (London 2009), 158f.; Fentz, Friis, *Våde jobs*, 72.
- ²⁰ Thomas Wegener Friis, *Bezpieczeństwo Danii a migracja z Europy Wschodniej* [Denmark’s Security and Migration from Eastern Europe], in: Sławomir Łukasiewicz (ed.), *Tajny oręż czy ofiary zimnej wojny? Emigracje polityczne z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej* [Secret Weapons or Victims of the Cold War? Political Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe] (Warsaw 2010), 293-300.
- ²¹ *Yearly Report 1982. Archive of Danish Police Intelligence (PET-Archive)*, DIIS-Samling, Nr. 142. Frunza was aware that rumors were used against the political active émigrés, but as the PET did not engage into dialogue, he would have had no chance to counter such beliefs.
- ²² Adi Frimark, Thomas Wegener Friis, *The least likely of enemies. Hungarian Intelligence in Denmark during the Cold War*, in: Dieter Bacher, Magdolna Baráth (eds.), *Hungarian Intelligence Services in Austria during the Cold War* (Budapest 2021), 71-93, here 78-83.
- ²³ Nir Levitan, Thomas Wegener Friis, *Far away: The relation between Denmark and Israel*, in: Tore T. Petersen (ed.), *Israel in a turbulent region. Security and foreign policy* (London 2019), 149-175, here 156f.
- ²⁴ At least this little flattering picture is drawn in the documentary “Zum Schweigen gebracht: Georgi Markov und der Regenschirmmord” by Klaus Drexel (2013).
- ²⁵ *PET tager Århus-kidnapningen med ro*, in: *Berlingske Tidende*, 12.9.1998, 2.
- ²⁶ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge 2004), 333.
- ²⁷ Ole Stig Andersen, *En PET-Chefs erindringer* (Copenhagen 2012), 534.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 410.
- ²⁹ *PET-Kommissionens Beretning. Vol. 1: Indledning* (Copenhagen 2009), 190.
- ³⁰ Max Weber, Hans Gerth, Charles Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London 2009).
- ³¹ *PET tager Århus-kidnapningen med ro*, in: *Berlingske Tidende*, 12.9.1998, 2.
- ³² *Politiets Efterretningstjeneste Årlige Redegørelse 2018* (Copenhagen 2018), 23f.
- ³³ *PET-Press release: Leading ASMLA members arrested in Denmark for espionage on behalf of Saudi Arabia*, 3.2.2020; <https://www.pet.dk/Nyheder/2020/Ledende%20ASMLA-%20medlemmer%20anholdt%20for%20spionage%20i%20Danmark.aspx>.
- ³⁴ Hans Jørgen Bonnichsen, *Hånden. En PET- og Politikrøn* (Copenhagen 2006), 189.
- ³⁵ *Vi jager da stadig spioner*, in: *B.T.*, 27.3.1995, 14.
- ³⁶ Lars Erslev Andersen, *Denmark. From State Security to Security State: The Invention of Preventive Security*, in: Bob De Graaf, James M. Nyce (eds.), *The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures* (London 2016), 95-108, here 98.
- ³⁷ *Politiets Efterretningstjeneste Årlige Redegørelse 2018* (Copenhagen 2018), 21.

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Fig. 6 Photo: Mogens Engelund, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hans-Jorgen-Bonnichsen.jpg>.